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3 MARCH 1986

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

ROUTING SLIP

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11	IG				
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SUSPENSE		17 Mar 86 Date			

Remarks

To 7: Please have response prepared for DCI signature.

Executive Secretary

3 Mar 86

Date

STAT

THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION

Executive Registry

86-

0873

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February 25, 1986

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Mr. William J. Casey
 Director
 Central Intelligence Agency
 Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Bill:

The enclosed proposal describes a study which we think is important. Its author is Ladislav Bittman, who continues to use his pseudonym even though he appears regularly on TV under his real name.

This proposal really deserves to be funded. It could be of immense value to your guys who handle defectors. Bittman, however, is adamantly opposed to taking government money - especially Agency money. He's afraid that this would jeopardize his academic reputation. So we've got to find the money somewhere. Any ideas?

Sincerely,


 William W. Geimer

WWG/dmw

Enclosures

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Boston University

College of Communication
640 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, Massachusetts 02215
617/353-3484

School of Journalism



Proposal to:

The Jamestown Foundation
1708 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009

From:

Dr. Lawrence M. Martin
Associate Professor of Journalism
Boston University
College of Communication

Project Title:

The Treatment of Defectors:
Psychological Trauma of Defection,
Debriefing, and the Process of
Adjustment to American Society

Proposed Project Period:

June 1, 1986 - December 31, 1986

Funds Requested:

\$28,537

Project Director:

Dr. Lawrence M. Martin

Date:

February 10, 1986

Boston University

College of Communication
640 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, Massachusetts 02215
617/353-3484

School of Journalism



February 10, 1986

**The Treatment of Defectors:
Psychological Trauma of Defection,
Debriefing, and the Process of
Adjustment to American Society**

by

**Dr. Lawrence M. Martin
Associate Professor of Journalism
former Czechoslovak Intelligence
Agent and Defector**

SITUATION

In the summer of 1985, former KGB officer Vitaly S. Yurchenko defected to the United States. In early November, he fled from CIA handlers and returned to the Soviet Union. The Yurchenko case became a major public embarrassment for the CIA personnel responsible for his debriefing and security. The CIA has been publically criticized for failing to pay enough attention to the psychological needs of defectors and for ineffective methods of dealing with them during and after the debriefing process.

The Treatment of Defectors

February 10, 1986

Page -2

All defectors suffer severe emotional strain that forces some of them to consider returning to their homeland, even though they know that they'll be severely punished. According to Senator Dave Durenberger, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "about 50 percent of the people who defect to the United States return to their homeland."

The Yurchenko incident motivated the Administration to start an inter-agency review to find ways to prevent a similar re-defection in the future and to help defectors find their place in American society. In January 1986, the White House announced that the Administration was considering a new set of guidelines for the treatment of defectors.

Our knowledge about the decision-making process in the Soviet bloc depends largely on information brought by defectors. The Soviet intelligence superiority in human intelligence is to a degree outweighed by the vital information brought to the United States by defectors. In 1985, for example, four high level Communist intelligence agents fled to the West, bringing with them priceless information about the Soviet decision-making elite, the KGB, the GRU, the Soviet Army, and numerous Soviet industrial and scientific projects.

(more)

The Treatment of Defectors
February 10, 1986
Page -3

MAJOR OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT

Many Americans outside or even inside the government, the CIA and FBI operatives included, have a difficult time understanding the problems of defectors, their moods, fears, and culture shock symptoms. Their behavior, especially in the early period after defection, can be highly unusual and even bizarre.

The major objectives behind this study are:

1. To help American officials who are dealing with defectors (including members of the debriefing teams) to understand the psychological trauma of defection and to help them avoid major mistakes in the treatment of defectors;
2. To develop a more effective debriefing procedure because, according to my personal experience, the existing system leaves many important areas of Communist intelligence operations untouched;
3. To help the debriefing teams understand the problem of disinformation and defectors;
4. Finally, to suggest a series of measures that would help defectors with their integration into American society.

(more)

The Treatment of Defectors
February 10, 1986
Page -4

BACKGROUND ON THE AUTHOR AND THE ORGANIZATION

The College of Communication at Boston University is one of the leading professional schools of communication in the country. Founded in 1947, the College has gained a national reputation for its graduate and undergraduate programs in public relations, journalism, film, broadcasting, and mass communication. The faculty includes outstanding communication educators with both professional and academic backgrounds.

The College of Communication offers the widest range of professional communication programs available in the United States. In addition to the regular undergraduate and graduate programs, dual-degrees are offered in International Relations and Communications; Journalism and Afro-American Studies; Broadcast Administration and a Master's in Business Administration; and Mass Communication and a Juris Doctorate.

The College has 47 full-time faculty and 55 part-time faculty, drawn from the academic and professional fields of communication. The alumni are found in every professional area of communication and many are in key positions. Among these graduates are winners of such awards as Pulitzer Prizes, Academy Awards, Rhodes Scholarships, and numerous other honors and awards in the field of communication.

(more)

The Treatment of Defectors
February 10, 1986
Page -5

In addition to its diversified academic programs, the College of Communication also meets the training needs of corporations and individuals. Clients and staff of such companies as Mobil Oil, Raytheon, Air France, and Saudi Basic Industries regularly attend specially designed training programs offered through the College's Office of External Programs. Recent programs have included such topics as Persuasion Communication and Negotiation, Media Relations, Publications Management, and Public Communication in the United States. As noted in the January 16, 1986 issue of USA TODAY, Boston University's College of Communication is the only institution in the United States offering the academic study of disinformation. A course on Disinformation and the Press is designed mainly for students interested in international relations and communications.

Associate Professor Dr. Lawrence M. Martin, the author of the project, is a leading authority on the subject of disinformation.

Martin is a former Czechoslovak diplomat, journalist, and intelligence operative, who served for several years as the deputy commander of the Czechoslovak Disinformation Department before his defection to the United States in 1968 in reaction to the Soviet military invasion of Czechoslovakia. He is the author of several books, among them The Deception Game (Syracuse

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The Treatment of Defectors
February 10, 1986
Page -6

University Research Corporation, 1972), and The KGB and Soviet Disinformation, published in September 1985 by Pergamon Press.

In the spring of 1984, Tel Aviv University invited Professor Martin to conduct a four-week seminar on disinformation and the mass media for their journalism students. The seminar, as well as his public lectures, received considerable attention by the Israeli press.

PROPOSED PROJECT

The author of this proposal suggests to prepare a comprehensive study concerned with the treatment of defectors from communist countries by American government officials. This study will include analysis of the psychological trauma of defection, the debriefing procedures, and the process of adjustment to American society. If approved, the final report would be written as an orientation and instructional text for American officials responsible for debriefing defectors. The final report of at least 100 double-spaced pages would be submitted six months after approval.

The study will cover the following major subjects:

1. History of East West Relations and the Role of Defectors

Since 1917, a great number of prominent Soviet (and later Soviet bloc) government officials, journalists, scientists,

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The Treatment of Defectors
February 10, 1986
Page -7

intelligence operatives and military officers defected to the west. This study would include an evaluation of their personal successes and failures in their new countries.

Also included will be analyses of defectors as major sources of secret information about Soviet bloc political, military, economic and scientific elite, plans, and policies as well as operations by Soviet bloc intelligence agencies targeted at the United States and our allies.

2. The Trauma of Defection

Questions covered will be: why they come, an analysis of personal motives of defectors who came to the United States in the last 40 years and who published books or articles about their experiences, and why some defectors do not want to come to the United States, preferring to stay in Europe although the security risk is much higher there.

Other topics include: the decision to defect and its immediate traumatic effect; the feeling of leaving everything behind forever (their country, family, friends, values, etc.); the feeling of guilt and the psychological shock that follows; the defector's fear of reprisal for himself and his family abroad as well as at home; the need for well-trained American

(more)

The Treatment of Defectors

February 10, 1986

Page -8

debriefing team members knowledgeable in human psychology;

and intercultural communication problems including the

phenomenon of culture shock as well as intelligence

procedures and practices.

3. Strategies and Tactics for Debriefing

The importance of conducting the debriefing in the defector's native language and how communication in a foreign language affects and distorts the defector's testimony will be investigated.

Also studied will be: how to help the defector overcome his feelings of guilt; a defector's strategies to protect the identities of communist agents he personally liked or who were associated with positive events in his life; and the defector's fear of publicity.

Other topics include: signals of continuing depression and the decision to return home even at the price of severe punishment; major mistakes by members of the debriefing teams; and recommendations to improve the debriefing process.

(more)

The Treatment of Defectors
February 10, 1986
Page -9

4. Defectors as Double Agents

Covered under this section will be: the use of defectors for disinformation purposes; potential advantages and risks of sending an intelligence officer out as a phony defector with a disinformation message; techniques of verifying the defector's statements; defectors' tendency to "please" the debriefing team by exaggeration; dealing with conflicting statements; and warning signals about the defector's lack of sincerity.

5. Case Study: Vitaly Yurchenko

This study will examine the defection and re-defection of Vitaly Yurchenko, the evidence for and against the theory that he was a double-agent on a special mission sent to United States by the KGB, and the value of Yurchenko's testimony before going back to the Soviet Union as the major clue for establishing his legitimacy as a bona fide defector.

The mistakes and insensitivities of the debriefing team that can be identified from public statements by Yurchenko at the press conference in Washington and the Soviet tactics to use Yurchenko for propaganda and disinformation purposes after his re-defection will also be discussed.

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The Treatment of Defectors
February 10, 1986
Page -10

6. Treatment of Western Defectors by Communist Intelligence

Services

The study will include a discussion of defectors who have left the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, and France for the Soviet bloc countries -- their reception, debriefing, and treatment.

Their employment opportunities, pension arrangements, and housing will be explored as well as the psychological trauma of Western defectors living in communist countries.

7. Helping the Defector from a Communist Country Find His/Her Way into the Mainstream of American Society

Also discussed will be: my experience of establishing a new career, recommendations on how to help defectors during the first few years -- the most critical years of their adjustment, and an analysis of the problems of personal security.

Mention will be made of the stories of other defectors who have been able to establish new successful careers in the U.S., an important message for potential defectors.

(more)

The Treatment of Defectors
February 10, 1986
Page -11

BUDGET

Proposed Project Period: June 1, 1986 - December 31, 1986

1. Salaries and Benefits

1/6 time academic year	\$ 6,250
Full time summer (June, July, August)	12,499
Fringe benefits	3,788

2. Part Time Researcher/Editor 3,000

3. Research Materials

Computer data bases and clipping services	500
Books, periodicals	200

4. Long Distance Telephone Calls 300

5. Travel 2,000

TOTAL	\$28,537
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DR. LAWRENCE M. MARTIN
10 Ocean Avenue
Rockport, Massachusetts 01966
617/546-3938

10 november 1985

College of Communication
Boston University
640 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
617-353-3945

Education: Realne Gymnasium, Prague, Czechoslovakia; Diploma 1950
Charles University, Prague; J.D. in International Law 1955
Charles University, Prague; M.A. in Journalism 1967

Languages: Czech, English, German, Russian

Professional
experience: 1953-54 Five month diplomatic mission in Korea as member of
Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission

1955-61 Chairman, Educational Department of International
Relations, Ministry of Interior, Republic of
Czechoslovakia; German Desk Officer, Czechoslovak
Intelligence Service

1961-63 Third Secretary (Cultural Attache), Czechoslovak
Embassy, Berlin

1964-66 Deputy Chief, Department of Black Propaganda and
Disinformation, Prague

1966 German and Austrian Desk Officer, Press Department,
Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs

1966-68 Press Attache and Public Relations Officer,
Czechoslovak Legation, Vienna

1968 After Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, asked
United States government for political asylum;
granted

1969-70 Research Associate, Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, MA

1971-72 Lecturer, School of Public Communication, Boston
University

1972-78 Assistant Professor, SPC, Boston University

1978 Associate Professor of Journalism, SPC, Boston
University.

Publications: Prvni Zemrel Kanceler (The Chancellor was the First to Die), Prague: Magnet, 1968. The background of the Nazi putsch in Austria in 1934, and the internal political developments up to the Anschluss of 1938.

Department D: The Role of Disinformation in Soviet Diplomacy, written as a text for the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1970; rewritten in 1972 and published under the title The Deception Game: Czechoslovak Intelligence in Soviet Political Warfare, Syracuse: Syracuse University Research Corporation; paperback edition published by Ballantine Books in October, 1981.

'Public Diplomacy and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia,' with S. W. Barton, in Gregory Henderson, editor, Public Diplomacy New York: Praeger, 1973.

'Images, Immigrants and Their Press' in Bernard Rubin editor, Small Voices and Great Trumpets: Minorities and the Mass Media, published in 1980 by Praeger. The article analyzes the ethnic press of four European minorities and the coverage of these groups by the American media.

Spionazni Opratky (Spy Gallows), personal memoirs written in Czech covering the author's 14-year experience in the Czechoslovak intelligence service. Published in December, 1981 by 68 Publishers, Toronto.

Zum Tode Verurteilt, Memorien eines Spions, Munich: Koitman Verlag, 1984. The German translation of the personal memoirs.

The KGB and Soviet Disinformation, An Insider's View, an analysis of the Soviet bloc active measures against the United States in the last 15 years. Published in September 1985 by Pergamon-Brassey's.

Activities: Before finishing studies at Charles University, sent to Korea as member of Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission; participated in the normal diplomatic activities involved in POW repatriation.

After university graduation, intensive teaching activity as Chairman of Educational Department for International Relations at Ministry of Interior and research officer of Czechoslovak intelligence service. Sent to Berlin in 1961 as diplomat and intelligence officer, had extensive contact with East and West German leaders.

As Deputy Chief of the Department for Black Propaganda and Disinformation, formulated political and public affairs policies; had intimate knowledge of the official and covert propaganda activities of Soviet-bloc countries and knew Austrian leaders and foreign correspondents.

After coming to the United States (1968), have taught, lectured, done research and writing on international propaganda and deception.

Personal: Born Ladislav Bittman in Prague, Czechoslovakia, 14 Feb. 1931.

NYTIMES, JAN. 20, 1986, p.14

U.S. PLANS TO MAKE DEFECTORS SECURE

NYT, JAN. 20, 86

Study on Turnabout of K.G.B.
Officer Prompts Proposals

by PHILIP SHENON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 19 — The Reagan Administration is actively considering plans to provide guaranteed lifetime incomes to high-ranking defectors and may attempt to reduce the waiting time required for conferral of American citizenship, a senior White House official said today.

The official said the proposals were the result of an interagency review of the handling by the United States of Vitaly S. Yurchenko, the Soviet intelligence official who defected to the West last summer but later decided to return to Moscow.

The Administration, by offering permanent income and conferring citizenship more speedily, would hope to prompt additional defections while reducing the chance that a defector would want to leave the United States, said the White House official, who asked not to be identified.

"Yurchenko was an embarrassment, of course," a law-enforcement official said. "We are looking for ways to be certain that it does not happen again."

The handling of Mr. Yurchenko, described by the Administration as a senior officer of the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence agency, prompted harsh criticism of the Central Intelligence Agency and its methods of dealing with defectors. There were accusations that the agency had failed to pay enough attention to his psychological needs.

Criticism on Jobs and Income

Although not a direct concern in the Yurchenko case, the intelligence community has also been criticized for purported reluctance to provide assured incomes for defectors. Some have complained that the C.I.A. has failed to help them find suitable jobs.

If word of the financial problems of defectors gets back to their native countries, "We'll certainly have fewer defectors," said an intelligence source.

Another proposal under consideration at the White House would sharply reduce the waiting time, now sometimes as long as 5 to 10 years, facing some defectors who want to become American citizens.

Senator Patrick J. Leahy, the Vermont Democrat who is vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said Federal guidelines already permit defectors to be adequately compensated for their information. And he said defectors were usually permitted expedited citizenship, when requested.

But Senator Leahy said he might welcome even more concrete guidelines. "I can see where we might want to clarify them," he said. "I do think, though, that we have adequate provisions to cover a defector's income. There is a great deal of flexibility."

Turnabout Prompts a Review

After Mr. Yurchenko returned to the Soviet Union, the Administration began an interagency review — including representatives of the C.I.A., National Security Agency and Justice Department — to find ways to prevent a similar defection.

"We want to know, quite frankly, how one can do this better," the White House official said. "Knowing how to properly treat defectors is one of the most complex issues to be dealt with in the world of espionage."

Intelligence specialists have said that virtually all defectors to the United States suffer severe emotional strain that prompts them to consider returning to their homeland.

The White House official said that the interagency team was considering revisions in the responsibilities of the C.I.A. and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in dealing with defections.

Mr. Yurchenko, described as one of the most senior Russian officers ever to defect to the West, fled from C.I.A. handlers in early November and returned to the Soviet Union.

At a news conference at the Soviet Embassy on Nov. 4, he said that he had been kidnapped by American authorities in Rome last summer and then held prisoner by C.I.A. officials. The Administration has repeatedly denied his story.

STAT

JAN. 20, 1986 p. 11

THE BOSTON GLOBE MONDAY, JANUARY 20, 1986 11

FBI may take over defector cases from CIA in wake of Yurchenko issue

By George Gedda
Associated Press

WASHINGTON — The Reagan administration, unhappy with the CIA's handling of former Soviet KGB agent Vitaly Yurchenko, may reduce the CIA role in defector cases and give primary responsibility to the FBI, sources say.

"I think it's a great move," said a senior White House official, who contended that defectors invariably have been able to establish much closer relations with FBI personnel than CIA officers.

The official said the proposal has been under consideration for some time and was given additional impetus by Yurchenko's surprise decision to return to the Soviet Union last November after three months in CIA custody.

Edward Djerejian, White House spokesman, acknowledged that the procedures for dealing with defectors are being reviewed, but he declined comment on the options under consideration. FBI and CIA spokesmen refused to discuss the issue.

Other experts, all of whom declined to be identified, said the government is considering a variety of proposals to entice disillusioned Soviet bloc agents to defect and to avoid another embarrassment similar to the one involving Yurchenko.

The options include granting

high-ranking defectors an automatic permanent income, reducing the five- to 10-year waiting period for the conferral of American citizenship and the creation of a "think tank" comprised exclusively of defectors, the sources said.

Such an institution, they said, would provide a pool of wisdom government policy makers could draw on.

Discussing Yurchenko, Donald Jameson, a former CIA official who has had extensive experience with defectors said, "Nobody could have handled that case worse than the CIA."

Yurchenko, who defected in July, fled from his CIA handlers on Nov. 2 and returned to the Soviet Union four days later after turning himself in to the Soviet Embassy.

He is regarded by US officials as a genuine defector although he claimed he was abducted, drugged, tortured and held incommunicado by the CIA before his escape.

Sen. Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.) said the CIA has made defector resettlement a "dead-end career assignment." He advocates giving the FBI the leading role for dealing with defectors.

Several other experts said a permanent income for defectors would be the best way to compensate them for the valuable infor-

mation they provide the government.

Because of CIA reluctance to provide a lifetime income to most defectors, their principal fear is that "they will fall off the economic ladder," one observer said.

Defectors' experiences

He said one defector who had provided extremely useful information to the CIA was at the point of fleeing to South America because of his disgust with the agency's refusal to give him an assured income.

Nicolae Horodincea, a Romanian defector, expressed profound disillusionment with the CIA, contending that the agency broke promises to provide him with a job, a house, life insurance and medical insurance.

"The CIA makes zombies of defectors," said Horodincea, who has had no contact with the agency in more than four years.

Vladimir Sakharov, a Soviet defector, said the CIA repeatedly ignored his academic accomplishments and sent him to a motel management school. After the school went bankrupt, the CIA recommended that he sell shoes, clothes or cars, he said.

Sakharov broke with the CIA three years ago and said he is doing well on his own. He lectures frequently and is writing a book.

Asked for comment, the CIA said it never discusses treatment of defectors.

At present, the CIA has statutory responsibility for defectors, but FBI personnel often become involved on an ad hoc basis.

According to one analyst, the bureau is much better equipped than the CIA to assist defectors who settle outside Washington because of the FBI's nationwide responsibilities and superior manpower.